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1 Introduction
An unsettled debate in the economics literature is about the role of divorce laws
on the probability of marital dissolution, focusing in particular on the big shift in
the divorce behavior in the United States (US) in the last five decades. Between
1965 and 1980, the divorce rate in the US more than doubled reaching a rate of
around 8 divorces per 1000 adults and then it started to decline steadily together
with the marriage rate. As a reason of this profound change in the divorce rate,
a number of empirical works cites the adoption, in 1970s, by majority of states of
looser divorce laws which allowed spouses to unilaterally file for divorce. While
Peters (1986) finds no impact of the newly adopted unilateral divorce laws on
divorce rates between 1975 and 1978, Allen (1992) finds, using the same data set,
significant and permanent effects when he controls for geographical differences
in divorce propensities. Using US state level panel data from 1968 to 1988 so
as to control state and year fixed effects as well as state-specific time trends,
Friedberg (1998) shows that unilateral divorce laws led to a 6% higher divorce
rate and explains 17% of the increase in divorces. Later, Gruber (2004) finds,
using the US census data from 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990, a similar positive
effect of the unilateral divorce laws on the stock of divorced women and men.
More recently, Gonza´lez and Viitanen (2009) and Kneip and Bauer (2011) show
using longitudinal data on divorce rates in large samples of European countries
that the results in the literature finding significant positive effects of unilateral
divorce laws are not pertinent to US. However, using an extended data set from
1956 to 1998 and adding some variables into the econometric analysis of Friedberg
(1998) so as to model the dynamic response of divorce explicitly, Wolfers (2003,
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2006) find that the adoption of unilateral divorce laws increased US divorce rates
sharply in the first two years following the adoption, but the effects of this legal
change decayed within a decade. A theoretical explanation (which we will further
address in this section) as to why short-term and long-term effects of a policy
switch from a mutual consent regime to a unilateral divorce regime may differ is
proposed by Rasul (2006).
In this paper, we use a two-period one-to-one matching model to examine the
effect of changes in divorce costs on marital dissolution. Since the exit option in a
marriage becomes easier with unilateral divorce, our paper implicitly studies the
effects of a shift to a unilateral divorce regime. In our setup, individuals, who are
heterogenous due to the nature of the one-to-one matching framework, decide
- under incomplete information about the nontransferable utility of marriage
with each of their potential mates - whether to marry or to remain single at
the beginning of the first period.2 Those who married in the first period learn
the utility of their marriage at the beginning of the second period and then
decide whether to stay married or to divorce for the rest of their lives. We
show that divorce costs affect not only individuals’ decision to divorce in the
second period but also their first-period decisions to marry as well as whom
to marry. Interestingly, the average probability of marital dissolution in the
society is affected by all these three decision channels, which we simply name as
‘the divorce channel’, ‘the marital status channel’ and ‘the marital composition
channel’ respectively.
We can separate the effect of divorce costs on marital dissolution through the
divorce channel, which we call ‘the incentive effect’, since the lower the divorce
2In situations where couples can efficiently transfer utilities, the change in divorce costs (or
generally divorce laws), as argued by Becker et al. (1977), can only affect the distribution of
welfare within marriages, not the marriage or divorce rates, thanks to the Coase theorem.
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costs, the higher the incentive for married couples to divorce in the second period.
In addition, we can also identify in our model a composite effect of divorce costs
operating through the other two channels, namely ‘the allocation effect’. While
it is certain that with lower divorce costs more individuals may decide to change
their marital status from single to married in the first period, the extent any
cost effects will be transmitted through the described marital status channel to
the average probability of marital dissolution entirely depends on the divorce
likelihoods of the new couples relative to those of the existing couples. The same
uncertainty is true about the operation of the marital composition channel, which
is novel to our study. To isolate the effect of this new channel, we will restrict
ourselves to environments where the controlled change in divorce costs induces
no impact on the marital status of individuals.
Our results show that the allocative effect of marital composition channel
has not a determinate sign, since a sufficiently big change in divorce costs can
ambiguously change the ordinal preferences of individuals over potential mates
and consequently the identities of the spouses in an equilibrium matching. Hence,
the ambiguity of the aggregate effect of divorce costs, as well. So, it is not
true that the average probability of marital dissolution can always be reduced
by tighter divorce laws that propose higher divorce costs. Conversely, it is not
true either that divorce rates will be higher under looser divorce laws. Indeed,
as the main result of our paper shows, for any society we can find matching
environments where under a gender-optimal matching rule the allocation effect
of divorce costs outweighs the incentive effect and thus the average probability
of marital dissolution in the society is nondecreasing in divorce costs.
The closest works that study the effects of divorce costs on marital dissolution
are Bougheas and Georgellis (1999) and Rasul (2006). In the multi-period setup
of both works, each individual is randomly matched with a potential partner and
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then decide to marry or to remain single in the first period depending on an
imperfect signal about the quality of the potential marriage. Those who marry
learn the true quality of the marriage at the beginning of the next period and
decide to remain married forever or to divorce and remain divorced forever. While
Bougheas and Georgellis (1999) allow the individuals unilaterally divorce, Rasul
(2006) examines the mutual consent regime as well to identify the effect of a
policy switch to a unilateral divorce regime. In both studies, the divorce channel
and the associated incentive effect (which is called ‘pipeline effect’ in Rasul, 2006)
work in the same unambiguous way as in our model: the lower the divorce costs,
the higher the divorce rate of existing couples in the short-run.
The marital status channel operates in Rasul (2006) by the effect of divorce
costs on the reservation (marriage market) signal of individuals, for any signal
level below which they would choose to remain single and draw a new potential
match in the next period from the pool of available mates. When divorce costs
decrease, the reservation signal of individuals increases, implying better matches
among those who choose to marry and consequently a fall in the divorce rate.
Rasul (2006) shows that this so called (by himself) ‘selection effect’ the newly
formed marriages have on the divorce rate may dominate in the long-run the
pipeline effect of lower divorce costs leading to higher divorce rates among existing
married couples.3 As remarked by Rasul (2006), the tension between the pipeline
and the selection effect explains the earlier empirical result of Wolfers (2003) that
looser divorce laws in the US led, in 1970s, to immediate positive effects on divorce
rates that died out in the long-term. On the other hand, the marital composition
3A similar effect potentially exists, yet not explicitly elaborated, also in Bougheas and
Georgellis (1999), where divorce costs negatively affect the number of marriages formed in the
society, with the effect being more pronounced when the signals received in the pre-marriage
stage are less informative. In such situations, many individuals marry when divorce costs are
low; however, the high noise in the signal implies that the probability of divorce is also high.
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channel is missing in the search theoretic matching models of Bougheas and
Georgellis (1999) and Rasul (2006) since all individuals of the same gender are ex
ante identical and the potential partner of each individual is randomly matched
in the pre-marriage stage; thus all possible couples are ex ante subject to the
same likelihood of divorce.
The problem of marriage formation and marital dissolution was recently stud-
ied by Mumcu and Saglam (2008) in a one-to-one matching framework with
‘transferable’ utilities under complete information. The solution procedure they
borrowed from Crawford and Rochford (1986) had been proposed for a general
problem of matching under cooperative bargaining and is known to be inefficient.
Thus, this procedure allows Mumcu and Saglam (2008) to search for allocational
effects of divorce costs in a non-Coasian environment. Mumcu and Saglam (2008)
show that even small changes in divorce costs that yield insignificant effects on
the post-divorce distribution of welfare may lead to wide fluctuations in the mar-
ital status of individuals with heterogenous endowments. Our paper differs from
Mumcu and Saglam (2008) in that utilities in our case are not transferable among
individuals. In fact, our work is, to the best of our knowledge, the first attempt to
deal with the problem of marital dissolution in a one-to-one matching framework
with ‘nontransferable’ utilities. The non-Coasian framework we use allows us to
study the effect of divorce costs on marital decisions in a society with heterogenous
individuals, while solely this heterogeneity activates the part of the allocation ef-
fect of divorce costs operating through the marital composition channel, which
the existing search-theoretic matching literature is currently missing.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 presents our results, and Section 4 concludes.
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2 The Model
There are two nonempty, finite and disjoint sets of individuals: a set of men, M
and a set of women, W . We assume min{|M |, |W |} ≥ 2. The society is denoted
by N = M ∪W .
Each individual has two periods to live. The beginning of the first period
involves a ‘matching’ stage, where individuals enter a marriage market where
all matchings between men and women take place according to their preferences
which we will define in Section 2.2. The individuals decide whether to marry or
to remain single at the matching stage under a given matching rule that selects
a stable matching with respect to their expected utilities calculated under their
beliefs about the qualities of their potential marriages.
At the beginning of the second period, each married individual enters a ‘per-
fect learning’ stage where the information about the quality of the marriage is
acquired and the individual has to decide, as an optimal response to this new
information, whether to stay married or to divorce. We assume that the society
has a unilateral divorce regime in which either spouse in a couple has the right to
unilaterally end the marriage. For simplicity, we assume that a marriage market
does not open in the second period; therefore individuals that choose to become
single in the matching stage will remain single in both periods, whereas married
individuals that decide to divorce in the perfect learning stage will become single
in the second period. Here, we let β > 0 to denote the common discount factor
of all individuals for the second period.4 Before deriving the equilibrium in this
4Although we do not drop the conventional assumption that individuals discount future
periods in their intertemporal choices, we allow β to exceed unity so as to simply model in our
paper also situations in which the first period is shorter than the second period, whereby the
remaining singlehood period of a divorced individual would be longer than the period in which
he or she was married.
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two-period matching model, we will describe a matching environment.
2.1 Matching Environment
A matching is a one-to-one function, µ : N → N such that for each (m,w) ∈
M ×W , µ(m) = w if and only if µ(w) = m; µ(m) /∈ W implies µ(m) = m and
similarly µ(w) /∈M implies µ(w) = w. If µ(m) = w, then m and w are matched
to one another. For any i ∈ M ∪W , i is single if µ(i) = i. Let MN denote the
set of all matchings for the society N .
For any i ∈ N , we denote by AN(i) the set of admissible mates in N ; i.e., the
set of individuals of the opposite gender. Then, AN(m) = W for all m ∈M and
AN(w) = M for all w ∈ W .
We assume that no individual completely knows in the first period the quality
(hence the utility) of any potential marriage. Let θij denote a random variable
representing the perception of individual i ∈ N of the quality of a marriage with
individual j ∈ AN(i). For all i ∈ N and j ∈ AN(i), we restrict the support of θij
to the interval [0, 1] and we assume that all individuals know these supports. We
let f ij(θ
i
j) denote the probability density function representing the beliefs of i ∈ N
about the quality parameter θij corresponding to a marriage with j ∈ AN(i). We
assume that the densities (f ij)j∈AN (i), i∈N are all independent. For each f
i
j , we
denote by F ij the corresponding distribution function. We assume that for each
i ∈ N and j ∈ AN(i), the beliefs {f ij , f ji } are mutually known to both i and j.
For each individual, a function U maps the type space [0, 1] to reals, with
U(θ) representing the instantaneous utility the individual derives from a marriage
with the perceived quality θ. We set the lowest utility individuals may get from
marriage to zero, i.e., U(0) = 0. Moreover, we assume that U(.) is strictly
increasing (hence the inverse function U−1(.) is defined and strictly increasing,
too).
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For each individual, we denote by U s the instantaneous utility of being single
and by c the instantaneous divorce costs, which is the same for both men and
women.5 For convenience, we assume 0 < U s − c < U(1); i.e., the instantaneous
net utility any individual obtains after getting divorced is positive and below his
or her instantaneous utility from a marriage with the highest quality. Here, we
also assume that each individual knows the list (β, U(.), U s, c) and that this list
is common for all individuals.
For a given society N , a utility-belief structure is described by the list ΓN =
(β, U, U s, (f ij)j∈AN (i))i∈N , and a matching environment by the list Φ = (ΓN , c).
Define also the notation Φ− = ΓN and Φ = (Φ−, c).
2.2 Equilibrium
Below, we will describe the equilibrium in our two-period matching problem,
going backwards from the perfect learning stage in the second period to the
matching stage in the first period.
Perfect Learning Stage: Individual i ∈ N who was matched to j ∈ AN(i) in the
first period learns the private quality parameter θij associated with his or her
marriage and decides whether to stay married or to divorce. The net utility in
the second period becomes U(θij) if individual i stays married whereas U
s − c if
individual i divorces. So, individual i decides to stay married to individual j if
and only if θij is not below a calculated threshold θ¯(c), where
θ¯(c) = U−1(U s − c) (1)
5Thanks to the assumed heterogeneity of beliefs of individuals about the quality parameters
of potential marriages, we will be able to obtain in Section 3 the allocation effect of a change in
divorce costs through the marital composition channel under our simplistic assumptions that
the utility functions as well as divorce costs do not differ across individuals or genders.
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We can immediately note that the quality threshold, θ¯(c), is nonincreasing in
divorce costs, c, and nondecreasing in the instantaneous utility of being single, U s.
Matching Stage: Each individual i ∈ N calculates the expected utility, E[U ij(c)],
derived from a potential match with individual j ∈ AN(i). (Note that E[.] is the
expectation operator.) By backward induction, we can calculate E[U ij(c)] in a
given matching environment (Φ−, c) as
E[U ij(c)] =
∫ 1
0
dθij f
i
j(θ
i
j)U(θ
i
j) +
β
[
(U s − c)Di,jΦ−(c) + [1− F ji (θ¯(c))]
∫ 1
θ¯(c)
dθij f
i
j(θ
i
j)U(θ
i
j)
]
. (2)
Above, the first term is the expected utility from the first-period of marriage and
the second term is the discounted second-period expected utility, where
Di,jΦ−(c) = F
i
j (θ¯(c)) + F
j
i (θ¯(c))− F ij (θ¯(c))F ji (θ¯(c)) (3)
denotes the probability that individuals i and j will divorce in the second period.6
For notational convenience, we also define E[U ii (c)] = (1 +β)U
s for all i ∈ N .
Thus, we have defined the expected utility E[U ij(c)] of each individual i derived
from a marriage with j ∈ AN(i) ∪ {i}. Apparently, the preferences represented
by these expected utilities are complete and transitive. For any matching en-
vironment (Φ−, c), we define the list E[U(c)] = (E[U ij(c)])j∈AN (i)∪{i}, i∈N as the
preference (or expected utility) profile of N and we denote the associated mar-
riage market by the triple (M,W,E[U(c)]).
We say that a mate j ∈ AN(i) ∪ {i} is acceptable for i ∈ N at the prefer-
ence profile E[U(c)] if E[U ij(c)] ≥ E[U ii (c)]. (Obviously, individual i is accept-
6Equation (3) follows from the fact that under a unilateral divorce law, any pair of individuals
i and j married in the first period will not divorce in the second period with probability
[1− F ij (θ¯(c)][1− F ji (θ¯(c))], since f ij and f ji are independent.
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able for i.) Given a marriage market (M,W,E[U(c)]), a matching µ is indi-
vidually rational if for all i ∈ N , the mate µ(i) is acceptable for individual i.
For a given matching µ, (m,w) is a blocking pair if they are not matched to
one another but prefer one another to their matches at µ; i.e., µ(m) 6= w and
E[Umw (c)] > E[U
m
µ(m)(c)] and E[U
w
m(c)] > E[U
w
µ(w)(c)]. A matching is stable if
it is individually rational and if there are no blocking pairs.
A well-known theorem by Gale and Shapley (1962) shows the existence of
a stable matching for every marriage market. We will require that all match-
ings realized in the first stage of the first period are stable. This completes the
description of the matching stage.
2.3 Gender-Optimal Equilibrium Matchings
As stable matchings in a matching environment are not necessarily unique, we
will restrict ourselves to a special selection of equilibrium, namely gender-optimal
matchings, which were first introduced and studied by Gale and Shapley (1962).
We say that men strictly prefer µ to µ′ if all men like µ at least as well as µ′,
with at least one man strictly preferring µ to µ′; i.e., E[U iµ(i)(c)] ≥ E[U iµ′(i)(c)]
with the inequality being strict for some i. We also say that men weakly prefer µ
to µ′ if either all men strictly prefer µ to µ′ or that all men are indifferent between
µ and µ′, i.e. E[U iµ(i)(c)] = E[U
i
µ′(i)(c)] for all i ∈ N . Similarly, we define strict
and weak preference relations for women.
For a given marriage market (M,W,E[U(c)]), a stable matching µ is said to
be M-optimal if men weakly prefer µ to any other stable matching. Similarly, a
stable matching ν is said to be W -optimal if women weakly prefer ν to any other
stable matching. We denote M -optimal and W -optimal stable matchings for the
matching environment Φ by µMΦ and µ
W
Φ , respectively. We also say that a stable
matching is gender-optimal if it is M -optimal or W -optimal.
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We know that in any matching environment Φ where men and women have
strict preferences, the ‘Deferred Acceptance Algorithm’ by Gale and Shapley
(1962) produces µMΦ if men propose to women and µ
W
Φ if women propose to men.
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Now, for any society we define a matching rule as a function from the set
of all matching environments to the set of all matchings. For any matching
rule µ(.) and any matching environment Φ, we denote by µ(Φ) the matching
selected at the matching environment Φ. We say that a matching rule µ(.) is the
M -optimal matching rule if it selects the M -optimal matching at all matching
environments; i.e., µ(Φ) = µMΦ for all Φ. We also define the W -optimal matching
rule analogously. We denote by µM(.) and µW (.) the M -optimal and W -optimal
matching rule respectively.
We should notice that the gender-optimal equilibrium matchings are non-
random, hence by definition they are assortative. However, differing from the
standard domain of assortative mating, in our one-to-one matching setup with
incomplete information, no equilibrium matching - whether it be gender-optimal
or not - is based on any observable characteristics of individuals. In fact, what de-
termines the equilibrium matchings in our case are just preferences (represented
by expected utilities) of individuals over potential mates and those preferences
7The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm with men proposing is simply as follows: In the initial
step, each man proposes to the most preferred one among all acceptable women. Each women
rejects the proposal of any man who is not acceptable to her and gets engaged to the most
preferred man among those whose proposals she has not rejected. At any step k ≥ 2, any man
who was not engaged in the previous step deletes the woman who rejected him in step k−1 from
his list of acceptable woman and proposes to his favourite woman, if any, in the updated list.
Each woman receiving proposals gets engaged to the most preferred acceptable man among the
group consisting of the man to whom she may have engaged in step k − 1 and men who have
just proposed in step k, and rejects all other members of this group. The algorithm stops after
any step in which no man is rejected. By changing the role of men and women in the above
procedure, we can similarly define the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm with women proposing.
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only depend on the beliefs of individuals over the unobservable qualities of the po-
tential marriages. Despite their apparent non-random nature, the gender-optimal
equilibrium matchings do not necessarily exhibit positive assortative mating in
terms of the preferences of men and women over equilibrium matchings. In fact, it
is known from Knuth (1976) that in matching environments where gender-optimal
equilibrium matchings, namely M -optimal and W -optimal stable matchings, dif-
fer, M -optimal stable matching is the least preferred stable matching for women
and oppositely W -optimal stable matching is the least preferred stable match-
ing for men. Moreover, it is not true either that the gender-optimal equilibrium
matchings should exhibit negative assortative mating in terms of preferences,
since these matchings may just coincide for some matching environments.
Before giving our results in the next section, we finally define, using (3),
the average probability of marital dissolution in the society N for the matching
environment (Φ−, c) under the matching rule µ(.) as
DNΦ−(c, µ) =
1
|W µΦ−(c)|
∑
w∈WµΦ− (c)
D
µ(Φ)(w),w
Φ− (c), (4)
where W µΦ−(c) = {w ∈ W | (w,w) /∈ µ(Φ)} is the set of women who were not
single in the first period.
3 Results
Below, we first observe that the probability of marital dissolution under any given
matching is nonincreasing in divorce costs.
Proposition 1. For any society N , any matching environment (Φ−, c), and any
matching µ ∈MN , we have DNΦ−(cˆ, µ) ≤ DNΦ−(c, µ) if cˆ > c.
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The above proposition follows from (1), (3) and (4) together with the facts
that ∂θ¯(c)/∂c ≤ 0 and that dF ij (θ)/dθ ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and j ∈ AN(i). We call
this effect, which also works in search theoretic models, to be the ‘incentive effect’
of divorce costs; since the higher the divorce costs, the higher the incentive for the
marriages that were formed in the first period to continue in the second period
as well. Indeed, divorcing becomes totally unattractive for the whole society
when divorce costs are sufficiently high; i.e., for all N and µ ∈ MN we have
limc ↓ Us DNΦ−(c, µ) = 0.
The incentive effect is only a partial specification of the relation between di-
vorce costs and marital dissolution, since given any non-constant matching rule
µ(.) and any matching environment (Φ−, c), a change in divorce costs c can also
change equilibrium matchings µ(Φ), which we have fixed in the above proposi-
tion.8 This dependence is evident from equations (1) and (2), since a sufficiently
large change in divorce costs can change the ‘ordinal’ preferences of the individuals
over their potential mates because of the heterogeneity of the individuals’ beliefs
and utilities. Naturally, impacts of divorce costs on the equilibrium matchings
will also be transmitted to the average probability of divorce now due to the het-
erogeneity of the individuals’ beliefs. We call this second effect of divorce costs on
the marital dissolution as the ‘allocation effect’. Below we formally define these
two effects.
Given any society N and any matching environment (Φ−, c), the change in
the average probability of marital dissolution under a matching rule µ(.) when
the cost value is changed from c to cˆ is given by
DNΦ−(cˆ, µ(Φ−, cˆ))−DNΦ−(c, µ(Φ−, c)) = ∆Aµ (cˆ, c,Φ−) + ∆Iµ(cˆ, c,Φ−), (5)
8A matching rule is constant if it selects the same constant matching at all matching envi-
ronments.
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where
∆Aµ (cˆ, c,Φ−) = D
N
Φ−(cˆ, µ(Φ−, cˆ))−DNΦ−(cˆ, µ(Φ−, c)) (6)
is the change in the average probability of marital dissolution for the matching
environment (Φ−, cˆ) due to a change in the matching from µ(Φ−, c) to µ(Φ−, cˆ),
and
∆Iµ(cˆ, c,Φ−) = D
N
Φ−(cˆ, µ(Φ−, c))−DNΦ−(c, µ(Φ−, c)) (7)
is the change in the average probability of marital dissolution under the matching
µ(Φ−, c) due to a change in the matching environment from (Φ−, c) to (Φ−, cˆ).
We call the terms ∆Aµ (cˆ, c,Φ−) and ∆
I
µ(cˆ, c,Φ−) respectively the allocation and
the incentive effect due to the change in divorce costs from c to cˆ.
By Proposition 1, we know that the incentive effect is always negative, i.e.,
∆Iµ(cˆ, c,Φ−) < 0 if cˆ > c. In fact, this is an already well-known result. (See,
for example, Bougheas and Georgellis, 1999 and Rasul, 2006). What we aim to
accomplish in the rest of this paper is to find the effect of the marital composition
channel on the probability of marital dissolution. To isolate the effect of this new
channel, we will consider environments where the controlled change in divorce
costs will not affect marital status of individuals in the society. So, the allocation
effect of divorce costs will arise only through the marital composition channel.
We will establish that unlike the incentive effect, this new effect does not have
a determinate sign, as will be evident from Examples 1 and 2. Below, we first
show that for any gender-optimal matching rule there exists a matching environ-
ment in which the allocation and incentive effect may work in opposite directions.
Example 1. Consider first the M -optimal matching rule µM(.). Consider a
society N involving M = {m1,m2} and W = {w1, w2} with Φ− given by β = 0.99,
U(θ) =
√
0.07 θ, U s = 0.15036, and
fm1w1 = f
w1
m1
= fw1m2 = f
w2
m1
= fm2w2 = f
w2
m2
= fa,
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fm1w2 = f
m2
w1
= f b,
where
fa(θ) =
 0.1380 if θ ∈ [0.200, 0.269]1.0639 otherwise,
and
f b(θ) =
 0.1429 if θ ∈ [0.200, 0.270]1.0645 otherwise.
Let c = 0.01286. We compute θ¯(c) = 0.2701. Then, the expected utility
profile E[U(c)] is calculated as follows:
E[U ij(c)] (i: rows; j: columns)
m1 m2 w1 w2
m1 0.299216 — 0.299313 0.299314
m2 — 0.299216 0.299314 0.299313
w1 0.299313 0.299306 0.299216 —
w2 0.299306 0.299313 — 0.299216
From the above table, it follows that
µM(Φ) =
 m1 m2
w2 w1
 ,
i.e., m1 and m2 are matched to w2 and w1, respectively. We then compute
DNΦ−(c, µ
M) = 0.396624. It is interesting to note that the equilibrium matching
µM(Φ) does not exhibit positive assortative mating in terms of the individuals’
preferences over stable matchings, since the W -optimal stable matching swaps
the mates of the two men under µM(Φ); i.e.,
µW (Φ) =
 m1 m2
w1 w2
 .
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Now, consider the matching environment (Φ−, cˆ) with cˆ = 0.01291. We com-
pute θ¯(cˆ) = 0.2699. Then, the expected utility profile E[U(cˆ)] is calculated as
follows:
E[U ij(cˆ)] (i: rows; j: columns)
m1 m2 w1 w2
m1 0.299216 — 0.299296 0.299293
m2 — 0.299216 0.299293 0.299296
w1 0.299296 0.299290 0.299216 —
w2 0.299290 0.299296 — 0.299216
It follows that
µM((Φ−, cˆ)) =
 m1 m2
w1 w2
 .
Here, we should immediately notice that µW ((Φ−, cˆ)) = µM((Φ−, cˆ)), that is the
increase in divorce costs from c to cˆ leads to a new stable matching that exhibit
positive assortative mating in terms of preferences over stable matchings. Now,
we calculate DNΦ−(cˆ, µ
M) = 0.396656, which is higher than DNΦ−(c, µ
M). We also
compute ∆Aµ (cˆ, c,Φ−) = 0.000279 and ∆
I
µ(cˆ, c,Φ−) = −0.000248.
Finally, by interchanging the names of men and women in the above society,
we can simply get the same result for the W -optimal matching rule µW (.), as
well. 
The allocation effect (obtained through the marital composition channel solely)
for the above example is positive and it dominates the incentive effect, hence we
get the increase in the average probability of divorce. It may seem surprising that
even though the rise in divorce costs in the above example changes an initial (say)
men-optimal stable matching which is, among all stable matchings, least preferred
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by women, to a new men-optimal stable matching which is the most preferred sta-
ble matching also for women, it leads to an increase in the probability of marital
dissolution. The underlying reason for this result is that equilibrium matchings
in our setup are formed according to the preferences of individuals over prospec-
tive mates, represented by the expected utilities of individuals derived from the
corresponding marriages. These expected utilities, which are calculated using the
beliefs of individuals (represented by some probability density functions) over the
unobservable qualities of the potential marriages, depend on all possible moments
of the associated probability distributions, while the probability of divorce be-
tween couples only depends on a single aspect of these beliefs, namely the size
of the lower tail of the couples’ probability distributions at the common quality
threshold. Since this particular aspect of the individuals’ beliefs do not sum-
marise all the relevant information in a probability distribution, we inevitably
observe an ambiguity about the relation between individuals’ preferences about
an equilibrium matching and the probability of divorce at the given matching.
Our next proposition below generalizes Example 1 to state that for any gender-
optimal matching rule and for any society there exists a matching environment
where some increases in divorce costs raise the average probability of marital
dissolution.
Proposition 2. For any society N and a given gender-optimal matching rule
µX(.) where X ∈ {M,W}, there exists a matching environment Φ = (Φ−, c) and
divorce costs cˆ > c such that we have DNΦ−(cˆ, µ
X) > DNΦ−(c, µ
X).
Proof. Consider first the M -optimal matching rule µM(.). Consider the
society N with the list Φ− in Example 1. Let N ′ = M ′ ∪ W ′ be any larger
society such that M ′ ⊇M and W ′ ⊇ W with at least one of the inclusions being
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strict. Consider the two cost values c = 0.01286 and cˆ = 0.01291. Consider
the list Φ′− = (β, U, U
s, (f
′i
j )j∈AN′ (i))i∈N ′ such that β = 0.99, U(θ) =
√
0.07 θ, and
U s = 0.15036. (Thus, we have extended all utility specifications for N in Example
1 to N ′.) By this construction, we have θ¯(c) = 0.2701 and θ¯(cˆ) = 0.2699. Now,
let f
′i
j = f
i
j if i ∈ N and j ∈ AN(i). Moreover, for all (i, j) ∈M ′ ×W ′ such that
(i, j) /∈M ×W , let f ′ij = f c, where
f c(θ) =
 0 if θ ∈ [0.200, 0.260]1.0638 otherwise.
Then, we have E[U ij(c)] = 0.299209 and E[U
i
j(cˆ)] = 0.299191 for all (i, j) ∈
M ′×W ′ such that (i, j) /∈M ×W . Since we also have E[U ii (c)] = E[U ii (c)(cˆ)] =
0.299216 for all i ∈ N ′\N , it follows that under both c and cˆ, all individuals in
N ′\N will decide to remain single in both periods. Thus, we have µM
′
(Φ′−, c)(i) =
µM(Φ−, c)(i) and µM
′
(Φ′−, cˆ)(i) = µ
M(Φ−, cˆ)(i) for all i ∈ N (with µM(Φ−, c) and
µM(Φ−, cˆ) defined in Example 1), and µM
′
(Φ′−, c)(i) = µ
M ′(Φ′−, cˆ)(i) = {i} for
all i ∈ N ′\N . It then follows that DN ′Φ′−(c, µ
M ′) = DNΦ−(c, µ
M) and DN
′
Φ′−
(cˆ, µM
′
) =
DNΦ−(cˆ, µ
M).
Finally, by interchanging the names of all men and women above, we can
simply get the desired result for the W -optimal matching rule µW (.), as well. 
The above proposition shows that there are environments in which a policy
change that decrease divorce costs, which are clearly a pure deadweight loss, is
Pareto improving. However, the following example shows that there are also
matching environments in which the opposite conclusion is true; i.e., an increase
in divorce costs reduces the average probability of marital dissolution. We show
that in such environments the allocation effect (through the marital composition
channel) turns out to be negative under gender-optimal matching rules.
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Example 2. Consider first the M -optimal matching rule µM(.). Consider a
society N involving M = {m1,m2} and W = {w1, w2} with Φ− given by β = 0.99,
U(θ) =
√
0.07 θ, U s = 0.15036, and
fm1w1 = f
w1
m1
= fm2w2 = f
w2
m1
= fa,
fm1w2 = f
m2
w1
= fw1m2 = f
w2
m2
= f b,
where
fa(θ) =
 10 if θ ∈ [0.20, 0.22]0.8163 otherwise,
and
f b(θ) =
 6.25 if θ ∈ [0.20, 0.24]0.7813 otherwise.
Let c = 0.01286. We compute θ¯(c) = 0.2701. Then, the expected utility
profile E[U(c)] is calculated as follows:
E[U ij(c)] (i: rows; j: columns)
m1 m2 w1 w2
m1 0.299216 — 0.307935 0.307887
m2 — 0.299216 0.308197 0.308259
w1 0.307935 0.308197 0.299216 —
w2 0.308259 0.307887 — 0.299216
From the above table, it follows that
µM(Φ) =
 m1 m2
w1 w2
 .
We then compute DNΦ−(c, µ
M) = 0.652596.
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Note that the equilibrium matching µM(Φ) does not exhibit positive assor-
tative mating, since the optimal stable matching from the viewpoint of women
turns out to be
µW (Φ) =
 m1 m2
w2 w1
 .
Now, consider the matching environment (Φ−, cˆ) such that cˆ = 0.02286. We
compute θ¯(cˆ) = 0.2322. Then, the expected utility profile E[U(cˆ)] is calculated
as follows:
E[U ij(cˆ)] (i: rows; j: columns)
m1 m2 w1 w2
m1 0.299216 — 0.302274 0.303467
m2 — 0.299216 0.303424 0.302192
w1 0.302274 0.303424 0.299216 —
w2 0.302192 0.303467 — 0.299216
It follows that
µM((Φ−, cˆ)) =
 m1 m2
w2 w1
 .
Here, we have µW ((Φ−, cˆ)) = µM((Φ−, cˆ)), that is the increase in divorce costs
from c to cˆ leads the society to an equilibrium that exhibits positive assortative
mating. We can now calculate DNΦ−(cˆ, µ
M) = 0.592446, ∆Aµ (cˆ, c, Φ−) = −0.009867
and ∆Iµ(cˆ, c,Φ−) = −0.050283.
Finally, by interchanging the names of men and women in the above society,
we can simply get the same result for the W -optimal matching rule µW (.), as
well. 
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Interestingly, the rise in divorce costs changes in Example 2, like in the previ-
ous example, a non-positive assortative mating to a positive assortative mating
in terms of preferences over stable matchings. Despite this striking similarity,
the sign of the allocation effect is different in the two examples, because of the
nontrivial differences in the heterogenous beliefs of the individuals.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the effect of changes in divorce costs on marital dis-
solution in a two-period one-to-one matching model with nontransferable utilities
under incomplete information. We show that divorce costs affect not only indi-
viduals’ decision to divorce and to marry but also their decision whom to marry.
Consequently, the average probability of marital dissolution in the society is de-
termined by these three decision channels, which we call ‘the divorce channel’,
‘the marital status channel’ and ‘the marital composition channel’, respectively.
Divorce costs always operate through the divorce channel in an unambiguous
way and yields a negative incentive effect on the average probability of marital
dissolution in the society (Proposition 1). The same effect has also been found in
search-theoretic models of matching. In this study, we also identify the allocation
effect of divorce costs. The allocation effect through the marital status channel
has already been studied in the search-theoretic matching literature: Rasul (2006)
identifies it and calls it the selection effect always working in the negative direc-
tion of the incentive effect (or the pipeline effect as he calls it) . However, the
allocation effect through the marital composition channel is novel to this study,
thanks to the existence of heterogenous individuals in our one-to-one matching
framework. To isolate the effect of the marital composition channel in our study,
we consider environments where the controlled change in divorce costs do not
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cause individuals to change their marital status. Thus, the allocation effect in
our study arises through the marital composition channel, only. Our results show
that the effect obtained through this new channel is ambiguous. For any gender-
optimal matching rule that always selects a stable matching which is optimal for
men or women, we can find matching environments (Example 1) in which the
allocation effect through the marital composition channel has a positive sign and
dominates the incentive effect as well as environments (Example 2) in which the
allocation effect through the marital composition channel has a negative sign and
reinforces the incentive effect. We should remark that the ambiguous sign of the
allocation effect (through the marital composition channel) should not be sur-
prising, since in our one-to-one matching framework the equilibrium (stability)
notion that determines the final matching allocations involves individual com-
parisons of expected utilities under alternative matchings, but not comparisons
of the corresponding expected divorce rates.
Following a similar classification of Rasul (2006), we call the incentive effect
and the allocation effect of a change in divorce costs to be the short-term effect
and the long-run effect, respectively. While a decrease in divorce costs always
increases divorce rates by the short-term effect, there are environments (as implied
by Proposition 2) where the long-term effect may outweigh the short-term effect
and leads to a fall in the divorce rates eventually. This theoretical result may
help to explain the empirical observation in Wolfers (2003, 2006) that a sharp
immediate rise in the US divorce rate after the divorce reform in 1970s is reversed
in the next decade to such an extent that the divorce rate is lower 15 years after
the reform.
We believe that another contribution of this study is to show that the one-
to-one matching theory with nontransferable utilities which has been heavily
used in studying stable matchings for given economic environments can also be
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successfully employed to study the issue of separation once an algorithm or rule
that produces stable matchings is chosen. While search theoretic framework has
its clear advantage in terms of formulating the equilibrium in a simple way in
large matching environments where the information about the potential partners
is more limited, the one-to-one matching framework may be powerful in small
environments that allow for assortative mating.
Finally, we believe that future research may benefit from the search theo-
retical works of Bougheas and Georgellis (1999) and Rasul (2006) to analyse in
a one-to-open matching framework also the effects of imperfect learning about
the potential partners on the marital dissolution, along with several potential
strategic issues in acquiring knowledge. Further research questions that can be
addressed in this new setup of ours is the sensitivity of our results to alternative
models of divorce which may allow remarriage or allow a correlation between an
individual’s quality or traits and divorce costs.
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